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Re: IR/IPE theory

1. What were the causes and consequences of the collapse of the bretton woods monetary system? Why has multilateral monetary coordination been so difficult to achieve and sustain since the 1970s? (bretton woods collapse, coordinating world fixed monetary system)

2. Some scholars argue that global capital markets have undermined the political and social compromise of “embedded liberalism.” do you agree? Why? (11, global capital markets, embedded liberalism)

3. American and european economic officials have criticized china for “holding the yuan at an artificially low level to assist chinese exporters, contributing to the trade imbalance.” analyze the domestic political sources and consequences of the chinese government’s decision to maintain a weak currency. In your essay, identify the winners and the losers of this policy choice both in china and in the rest of the world. Discuss also the domestic political factors behind us and european calls for a change in china’s exchange rate policy. (monetary policy, sources and consequences of policy, and critics domestic politics, china)

4. Why have the world bank and the imf been criticized as “us-serving control instruments” over the economic policies of developing countries? Do you agree with these claims? Have these institutions contributed in any way to the process of development and growth of the poorest countries in the world? In your answer, give specific examples. (pure 12, world institutions only serve us – true or not)

5. What is the relationship between history, institutions and economic development? Discuss the ways in which geography and factor endowments may influence the nature of this interaction. Refer to specific examples. (how factors+geography affects development)

6. How effective has foreign aid been in alleviating poverty and promoting growth? Discuss the main arguments in debates on the effectiveness of aid and refer to specific examples. (foreign aid – effective?)

7. International political economy (ipe) studies the dynamic interaction between states and markets in a context of increasing international interdependence. How has the balance between states and markets evolved since the end of the second world war? To what extent, and in what ways, was this balance altered by the accelerating pace of globalization since the 1980s? In your view, what were the implications of the more recent global financial crisis for (1) theoretical and scholarly debates on the balance between state and markets; (2) actual policy choices; (3) the structure of global economic governance? In your answer, be sure to combine theoretical insights with detailed empirical and historical analysis. (states and markets balance, recent financial crisis, theory, policy, who is running things)

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Re: IR/IPE theory

1) what are the key challenges that failed states pose to american foreign policy and what is the best way to deal with them?

2) in a secret government laboratory in gary, indiana, elite scientists are gathered for a top-priority project. Within ten years, they must engineer a superhero with two superpowers and put him/her/it in the field to help the united states with its foreign policy problems. To what superhuman abilities should they devote their labors?

3) the national security council has asked you to draft a policy memorandum assessing the top threats that will face american foreign policy in the year 2020 and how best to meet these challenges.

4) “you are well aware that it is not numbers or strength that bring victories in war. No, it is when one side goes against the enemy with the gods’ gift of a stronger morale that their adversaries, as a rule, cannot withstand them.”

—xenophon, the persian expedition, book iii: The march to kurdestan

5) what does the past tell us about the future of the monroe doctrine?

6) “there is nothing more adverse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination and interest.”

—edward gibbon

7) what does the history of american nuclear doctrine tell us about the causes of american foreign policy since 1945?

8) “in the struggle between reason, on the one hand, and the momentum of military competition, on the other, reason proved a poor competitor.”

—george kennan

9) “to deal with the true causes of war one must begin by recognizing as of prime relevancy to the solution of the problem the familiar fact that civilization is a partial, incomplete, and, to a great extent, superficial modification of barbarism.”

—elihu root

10) “the pressure of outside opinion about human rights sustained over long periods of time, can indeed produce beneficial changes in both attitudes and institutions…. Whether governments, and the u.s. Government in particular, should be involved in exerting such pressures is more dubious. In this respect, governments have to take the world pretty much as they find it.”

—george kennan

11) which president’s foreign policy is the best model to manage america’s present problems?

12) what are the main causes of american adventurism abroad?

13) what were the biggest mistakes in american foreign relations and what practical policies would prevent their recurrence?

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Liberal Peace: Top down, international and elite actors, peacekeeping, democracy building, state-building.

Strategic Peacebuilding: bottom up, grassroots and mid-level actors, reconciliation, forgiveness etc.

1. Reconciliation/ forgiveness education/ state-building / state failure/ democracy building / nation-building/ market building/ responsibility to protect/ comprehensive sanctions/ targeted sanctions/ counter-terrorism strategies/ rule of law/ theories of change

2. International law and the nexus between peace and justice.

3. International Criminal Court versus national truth commissions.

4. Religious ethic of reconciliation and reconciliation practices.

5. Why is forgiveness education used, and what is the evidence for its impact?

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Re: IR/IPE theory

1. The Domestic Sources of Trade Policy

The distributional implications of trade policy. Winners and losers of protectionism. Theoretical approaches: interests, institutions and ideas.

*Frieden, Lake & Broz, ch. 2, 20, 21 & 24.

*Oatley, ch. 4, 5 & 6.

*H. Milner, “The Political Economy of International Trade,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999).

* H. Milner, “International Trade” in W. Carlnaes et. al. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations.

*J. Ikenberry, D. Lake and M. Mastanduno, “Approaches to Explaining American Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization, 42 (1988).

A. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 64 (1974).

H. Milner and K. Kubota, “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries,” International Organization, 59 (2005).

M. Bailey, J. Goldstein, and B. Weingast, “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade,” World Politics, 49: 3 (1997).

J. Alt et al., “The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry,” Comparative Political Studies, 29: 6 (1996).

J. Goldstein, “International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws,” International Organization, 50: 4 (1996).

D. Rodrik, “The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6: 1 (1992).

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PART III. MONEY and FINANCE

2. Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and Foreign Direct Investment

MNCs as political and economic actors in home and host states. Debate over the MNC and the nation-state. The “race to the bottom.” Types and impact of foreign direct investment.

*Frieden, Lake & Broz, ch. 9, 10 & 11

*Oatley (a), ch. 8 & 9.

*Gilpin, ch. 11.

*N. Jensen, “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment,” IO, 57 (Summer 2003).

*Q. Li and A. Resnick, “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries,” IO, 57:1 (Winter 2003)

J Frieden, “International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation,” IO, 48:4 (Autumn 1994).

J. Tuman and C. Emmert, “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America: A Reappraisal,” Latin American Research Review, 39: 3 (October 2004).

J. Dunning, The Globalization of Business (London: Routledge, 1993), ch. 5.

R. Caves, Multinational Enterprises and Economic Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

S. Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: CUP, 1996).

Z. Elkins, A. Guzman, and B. Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000,” IO, 60 (Fall 2006).

3. The International Monetary and Financial Systems

The postwar international monetary system. The collapse of the Bretton Woods system: competing explanations. Post- Bretton Woods arrangements. European Monetary Union. The recent global financial crisis.

*Frieden, Lake, & Broz, ch. 15 & 18.

*Gilpin, ch. 10

*Oatley, ch. 10, 11 & 15.

*J. Goodman and L. W. Pauly, “The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets,” World Politics, 46:1 (October 1993).

*B. Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), ch. 1, 4.

R. Deeg and M. O’Sullivan, “The Political Economy of Global Finance Capital” Review Article, World Politics, 61: 4 (October 2009).

E. Helleiner et al. “Special Forum: Crisis and the Future of Global Financial Governance,” Global Governance, 15 (2009).

A. David, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy,” International Studies Quarterly (1994).

E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994),

S. Haggard and S. Maxfield, “The PE of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World,” IO, 50: 1 (1996).

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4. Domestic Politics of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy-Making

Exchange rate politics. Societal and statist approaches to monetary and exchange rate policies. Exchange rate based stabilization (ERBS) strategies: economic and political trade-offs.

*Oatley (a), ch. 12 & 13 *

*Frieden, Lake, & Broz, ch. 13 & 16.

*L. Broz and J. Frieden, “The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001).

1. At the national level, the choice of exchange rate regime and the desired level of the exchange rate involve distributionally relevant tradeoffs

2. At the national level, the choice of exchange rate regime and the desired level of the exchange rate involve distributionally relevant tradeoffs

3. But the tedious predictability of currency values under the BrettonWoods system lulled most scholars into inattention

4. Exchange rate policies have been at the center of what are arguably the two most striking recent developments in the international economy: the creation of a single European currency and the waves of currency crises that swept through Asia, Latin America, and Russia between 1994 and 1999.

5.

*B. Cohen, “International Finance,” in Carlsnaes et. al. (eds.), Handbook of IR

*W. Bernhard, L. Broz and W. Roberts Clark, “The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions,” International Organization, 56, 4 (Autumn 2002).

D. Woodruff, “Boom, Gloom, Doom: Balance Sheets, Monetary Fragmentation, and the Politics of Financial Crisis in Argentina and Russia,” Politics and Society, 33, 3 (March 2005),

K. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

R. Roett, and C. Wise (eds.), Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America (Washington D. C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

J. Frieden and E. Stein (eds.), The Currency Game Exchange Rate Politics in Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001).

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PART IV: DEVELOPMENT AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

5. Developing Countries and Alternative Development Strategies

Central debates in development thinking: the role of the state in economic development and the impact of the international economy. East Asia and Latin American development strategies. The Washington Consensus and beyond.

*Frieden, Lake, & Broz, ch. 25, 26 & 28. *Oatley, ch. 6 , 7, 14.

*Gilpin, ch. 12.

*S. Maxfield, “International Development,” in W. Carlnaes et. al. (eds.) Handbook of International Relations.

*D. Rodrik, “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion,” Journal of Economic Literature (1996).

*Stiglitz & Serra (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered, ch. 1, 2, 4, 16 & 17.

J. Williamson, "Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus,'" World Development, 21: 8 (1993).

A. Hirschmann, “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82: 1 (1968).

The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policies, World Bank Policy Research Report (1993).

D. Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

N. Birdsall et. al, “Washington Contentious: Economic Policies for Social Equity in Latin America” Findings of the Commission on Economic Reform in Unequal Latin American Society (2001).

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6. Foreign Aid

*J. Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2006), ch. 10-18.

*W. Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).

*W. Easterly and T. Pfutze, “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22: 2 (2008).

*P. Collier, The Bottom Billion (Oxford: OUP, 2007), Ch. 7

*A. Alesina and D. Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, 5: 1 (2000)

D. Moyo, Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (New York, FSG, 2009)

W. Easterly, “Can the West Save Africa” Brookings Global Economy & Development Working Paper (2008)

C. Burnside and D. Dollar, “Aid Spurs Growth – In a Sound Policy Environment,” Finance and Development (December 1997).

A. Goldsmith, “Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa,” International Organization 55: 1 (2001),

R. Stone, “The political economy of IMF lending in Africa,” American Political Science Review, 98: 4 (2007)

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Grand Strategy

Weber, Max. 1958 [1946]. Selections from “Politics as a Vocation” [1919]. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills eds. New York: Oxford University Press, chap. 4, pp. 77-84, 118-28.

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1984. On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds. and trans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, selections from book 1, chap. 1, pp. 75-77, 80-81, 86-89.

Sean M. Lynn-Jones. 2000. Preface. In America’s Strategic Choices, Revised Edition, Michael E. Brown et al. eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, xi-xxxi.

Read this

http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/political-science/17-40-american-foreign-policy-past-present-future-fall-2010/lecture-notes/MIT17_40F10_GRANDSTR.pdf

Gholz, Eugene, Daryl G. Press, and Benjamin Valentino. 12 December 2006. Time to Offshore Our Troops. New York Times, op-ed, p. A31.

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Morgenthau, Hans J. 1965 [1946]. The Moral Blindness of Scientific Man. In Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chap. 7, pp. 168-203.

Layne, Christopher. 2006. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-9.

Betts, Richard. 2000. Is Strategy an Illusion? International Security 25, 2: 5-50.

Narizny, Kevin. 2007. The Political Economy of Grand Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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Military statecraft

Schelling, Thomas C. 2005. The Diplomacy of Violence. In International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, Robert Art and Robert Jervis eds. 7th Edn. New York: Pearson Longman, pp. 149-162.

Using military power as a threat to hurt the other side – Japan and Hiroshima

Weigley, Russell. 1986. American Strategy from its Beginnings through the First World War. In The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 15, pp. 408-443.

Military tactics oscillate between sheer force and strategy. Since WWI, the trend has been more to force: Operation Overlord in WW II was force. Nukes to Japan were strategic though, so strategy is still around, just not as prominently as it used to be

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Weigley, Russell F. 1973. The American Way of War: A History of United States Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.****, Robert. 1996. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, chap. 1, pp. 1-11.

Biddle, Stephen. 2004. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chaps. 3-4, pp. 28-77.

Press, Daryl. 2005. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Cohen, Eliot A. and John Gooch. 2006. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press.

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Nuclear history

1. Clausewitz: War is policy by other means

2. Brodie: How is nuclear power a policy by other means?

3. What starts out as structurally caused becomes bureaucratically driven

1. Security dilemma → bureaucratic politics

Groundwork

4. Secondary details

1. ABM == BMD. Defensive. Theater missile defense.

2. Kiloton = a thousand tons of TNT

3. Counterforce (military targets) vs Countervalue (civilian targets)

4. Assured Second Strike

1. You can absorb what the other side has to offer and get back at them

2. This is stable deterrence

5. Ballistic vs Cruise missiles

6. Nuclear vs neutron bombs

7. MIRVs (multiple independently targeted warheads)

1. this is what actually matters, not missiles

8. The Triad

1. three ways militaries send missiles

1. land, sea, air

2. history of bureaucratic politics here: first USA used air, soviets land, both were their strengths

3. Over time, both went for submarines

9. SIOP – what if you shoot lots of nukes at once but they hit each other in the air?

1. single integrated operational plan

10. Nukes

1. Delivery

2. Blast

3. Fallout

11. How many nukes are enough?

1. Course deterrence: Destroy about 200-250 biggest cities of their civilization

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5. Prime details

1. Human brain is good at seeing patterns even when there are none – that's why we have social science

1. Evidence: Germans were convinced the Americans had specific targets during WW II, but we weren't aiming at anything.

2. Why are nukes revolutionary?

1. Not: Destructive ability

2. What is: Speed

1. They expedite the timetable at which decision-makers have to make their decisions. You can kill too many people at once.

3. Also: Fallout

1. You may get sick and die two weeks later

4. Also: Concept of victory

1. What if you contaminate the world. How do you live after that?

3. What are nukes good for?

1. For defensive interests

2. Not good for

1. Bargaining

2. Offense

3. When:

1. Israel 1973:

1. If there is nothing to lose, Israel can bring everyone around them down, gets everyone's attention.

4. Nuclear weapons make the world safer for smaller states

1. → Increase in the number of small states

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A History:

1. Secondary details

1. Fear of the Nazi bomb starts this story

2. About 10-20 Billion dollars per year to keep the Nuclear arsenal

1. One of the cheapest defense deterrents for us

2. For others this is real money

3. We could never figure out a way to use the nuclear weapons: What do you do with a nuked Russia?

4. Splendid first strike

1. Not possible to do by mid-1950s. He doesn't want to turn the US into a garrison state that taxes its people and force them to live in nunkers

2. Military people have the credentials to be doves

5. PAL

1. permissive action links

1. only 20 years after nuke invention we can start launching them safely

6. Corona program shows us that we are clearly ahead of the USSR

7. JFK's flexible response

1. Switch to submarines

2. Putting nukes to planes is too expensive

3. Robert McNamara: He is evidence-based and offends people

1. He doesn't want to use bandwidth on mickey mouse ********.

2. This mom-and-pop tradition-based military department is inefficient like ********

3. “I will keep picking the ugliest belt buckles as long as you keep bringing me ******** decisions”

8. One of the costs of winning Cuban crisis was that we soon lose our nuclear quantitative superiority

1. You can't turn it into strategic capital though, it's bad nukes

9. Flexible options (1974), Sec. Def Schlesinger

10. Reagan: SDI

1. Republicans and Reagan: “defense is always good”

2. Nixon had gotten rid of it as useless and expensive

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2. Primary details

1. “we're going to use technology for whatever we can't match in manpower (Soviets)”

2. Ike

1. Nuclear sharing – stop your enemies from attacking your allies

2. How do you convince London is worth New York? Give them your nukes.

3. JFK

1. Flexible response

Conclusion

1. History of American nuclear strategy: security dilemma → bureaucratic politics

2. more plans, but no particular policy dividends

1. why? technology goes faster than politics

2. (soviets just target cities and call it done, avoiding excessive complexity)

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Brodie, Bernard. 1946. Selections from “War in the Atomic Age.” In Bernard Brodie ed. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., chap. 1, pp. 21-52.

Basic overview

Kaplan, Fred. 1983. Dr. Strangelove; The ABM Debate; Dancing in the Dark. In The Wizards of Armageddon. Stanford: Stanford University Press, chaps. 14, 24, 26, pp. 220-31, 343-55, 385-91.

Talk about defensive missiles

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Trachtenberg, Marc. 1991. “A Wasting Asset”: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954. In History & Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 3, pp. 100-152.

Freedman, Lawrence. 1986. The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists. In The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 25, pp. 735-78.

Biddle, Tami Davis. 2007. Selections from “Shield and Sword: U.S. Strategic Forces and Doctrine since 1945.” In The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy since World War II, Andrew Bacevich ed. New York: Columbia University Press, chap. 4, pp. 137-159.

Mueller, John. 2010. Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda. New York: Oxford University Press.

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America’s nuclear present

How to beat Blitzkrieg:

1. it has a tiny, thin head. By default: it's easier to punch a hole, then follow up with your army. But here, we're going to punch a hole and keep going deep in blitzkrieg.

Sagan-Waltz debate: Proliferation.

- primacy of which image?

Waltz: 3rd image – rational actors won't use nuclear weapons – on the margin proliferation is better

Sagan: No. We may sometimes have to invade, sacrifice 100k-200k troops to stop a country from proliferating.

Logic of Zero: Countries are trending towards zero proliferation.

Lieber, Press: Nuclear primacy. They show the US can make a splendid first strike, Russia is down and China is quite small.

Conclusion: How do you use these nukes for winning?

What drives American nuclear doctrine? How can US influence proliferation for the better?

Sagan, Scott D. and Kenneth N. Waltz. 2009. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. In Robert Art and Robert Jervis eds. International Politics, 9th edn. New York: Pearson Longman, pp. 217-238.

http://www.waynemclean.com/docs/HIR202-2013/Waltz%20-%20Nuclear%20Zero.pdf

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~plam/irnotes07/Sagan_Waltz_1995.pdf

Press, Daryl and Keir Lieber. 2006. The Rise of American Nuclear Primacy. Foreign Affairs 85, 2: 42-54.

Daalder, Ivo and Jan Lodal. 2008. The Logic of Zero. Foreign Affairs 87, 6: 80-95.

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Nitze, Paul.**28 October 1999.**A Threat Mostly to Ourselves.**New York Times, op-ed.

Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 2010. Preface. In Going Nuclear, Michael E. Brown et al. eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. xi-xlvii.

Fairbanks, Charles H., Jr., and Abram Shulsky. 2005. Arms Control: The Historical Experience. In Conflict After the Cold War, Richard K. Betts ed. 2nd edn. New York: Pearson Longman, pp. 423-432.

Weinberg, Steven. 2009. On Missile Defense and The Growing Nuclear Danger. In Lake Views: This World and the Universe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, chaps. 7-8, pp. 59-95.

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Civil-Military Relations

Posen, Barry. 1984. Selections from “Explaining Military Doctrine.” In The Sources of Military Doctrine. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, chap. 2, pp. 69-80

http://www.olivialau.org/ir/archive/pos1.pdf

What is military doctrine?

Offense

States bent on conquest will prefer offensive military doctrines

States will try to pass the costs of war to others

States will support offensive doctrines when power appears to be shifting against them. States without allies, facing multiple threats, will also favor offensive doctrines.

Jervis, Robert. 2010. Why Intelligence and Policymakers Clash. Political Science Quarterly 125, 2: 185-204.

Yingling, Paul. 2010. The Founders’ Wisdom. Armed Forces Journal (Feb.). Available at: http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/02/4384885/.

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Bacevich, Andrew J. 2005. The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War. New York: Oxford University Press.

Desch, Michael C. 1999. Civilian Control of the Military. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, esp. pp. 1-17.

Cohen, Eliot A. 2002. Supreme Command. New York: Free Press, esp. appendix, pp. 225-248.

Betts, Richard K. 1978. Enemies at Bay: Successful Intelligence. In Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press, chap. 8, pp. 183-193.

Johnson, Loch K. 2003. Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence. Comparative Strategy 22, 1: 1-28.

Betts, Richard K. 1991. Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rosen, Stephen P. 1991. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Feaver, Peter D. and Christopher Gelpi. 2004. Choosing your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Democracy and Foreign Policy

Kennan, George. 1984. American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, part III, chaps. 1-2, pp. 157-179.

Seriously distorted the understanding of a great many Americans about foreign policy, implying as they did that our policy was always the decisive mover of events everywhere in the world; that in any country of the world, including China, we had it in our power to prevent the rise to positions of authority of people professing Marxist sympathies; and that therefore if a communist takeover nevertheless occurred somewhere, this was always attributa*ble to the faint-heartedness or the remissness or the blindness or the lack of a suitable anticommunism on the part of the American administration then in office.

Nobody “dared to try to extract itself from the involvement at all, for fear of being pilloried by the silly charge that it had "lost Vietnam."

“We might call the failures “popular diplomacy as opposed to professional diplomacy. ”

Our constituencies consist of “particularly aggressive and vociferous minorities or lobbies”

One thing we can do “is to take realistic account of this unsuitability of our political system for the conduct of an ambitious and far-reaching foreign policy, and to bear these limitations in mind when we decide which involvements and responsibilities it is wise for us to accept and which would be better rejected. “

Page, Benjamin and Robert Shapiro. 1992. The Rational Public. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chap. 1, pp. 1-17.

Desch, Michael C. 2008. Introduction. In Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic Triumphalism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-7.

Ross, Michael L. 2011. Will Oil Drown the Arab Spring? Foreign Affairs 90:5: 2-7.

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Thucydides. 1998 [ca. 405 BCE]. The Peloponnesian War. New York: Norton, Books 2.65, 3.36-3.50, 5.84-5.115, pp. 82-83, 113-119, 227-231.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1998 [ca. 1518]. The Multitude is Wiser and More Constant than a Prince. In Discourses on Livy, Harvey Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov trans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Book I.58, pp. 115-19.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1963. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New York: Vintage, chap. 1-2, pp. 3-54.

Barzun, Jacques. 1987. Is Democratic Theory for Export? Ethics and International Affairs 1, 1: 53-71.

Snyder, Jack. 2000. From Voting to Violence. New York: Norton.

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Economic Statecraft

When you're behind, more state intervention works well

Once you're leading, you don't know where to cut the trail, so capitalism fares much better.

1. Smith v Marx

2. Hayek v Keynes

3. Kindleberger v Keohane

4. Milner v Mansfield

5. Baldwin v. Pa-pe

Fall of the US == rise of the BRICS

Understand:

IPE

globalization

economic statecraft

the 5 arguments

Trading with enemies: states don't trade, firms do. Ford might make panzers for Nazi Germany

Why the market functions? Parametric actors. You just accept the price . Why do we need states instead of just firms? States come in and make foreign firms and actors to just take the parametric pricing.

A recurring theme: As states expect more from people, they give more: Welfare/voting rights given around the time of mass army (WW I)

Earle, Edward Mead. 1986. Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, and Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power. In Makers of Modern Strategy, Peter Paret ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chap. 8, pp. 217-243.

Cohen, Stephen S. and J. Bradford DeLong. 2010. Conclusion: Other Countries’ Money. In The End of Influence: What Happens When Other Countries Have the Money. New York: Basic Books, chap. 7, pp. 143-148.

"The Asian export-led growth model must--over time-transform itself to domestic consumption and prosperity models. The American borrow-and-import model will also have to shift* again, this takes considerable time-to a model of consume at-the level-you-produce."

American economic growth:

Railroads to the west

Government mortgage and subsidy of highways and suburb way of life. Consumerism.

Finance-growing, manufacturing-closing, and import-driven economy

Now: Pumping money into the economy that consumers aren't doing. Only a temporary solution, cannot last.

Kirschner, Jonathan. 2002. Economic Sanctions: The State of the Art. Security Studies 11, 4: 160-79.

---

Fordham, Benjamin. 2007. “Paying for Global Power: Costs and Benefits of Postwar Military Spending” in The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II, Andrew J. Bacevich ed. New York: Columbia University Press, chap. 9, pp. 371-404, esp. pp. 372-385.

Baldwin, David A. 1985. Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Smith, Roy C. 2004. Adam Smith and the Origins of American Enterprise. New York: St. Martin’s.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Helen Milner, eds. 1997. The Political Economy of Regionalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Eichengreen, Barry. 2011. Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System. New York: Oxford University Press.

Frieden, Jeffry A. 2006. Global Capitalism: Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century. New York: Norton.

--------------------------------------------------------

International Organizations

Wade, Robert H. 2003. The Invisible Hand of the American Empire. Ethics and International Affairs 17, 2: 77-88.

Posen, Barry R. 2003. Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony. International Security 28, 1: esp. pp. 5-16, 42-46.

Kennedy, Paul and Bruce Russett. 1995. Reforming the United Nations. Foreign Affairs 74, 5: 56-72.

start-up costs, maintenance costs, employment costs, opportunity costs

high, low, depends, unseen

“get you to do what you should do in the long term, which you couldn't do otherwise”

discount rate problem

US (we) made UN and helped push forward EU integration, but we don't actually want them to operate properly. A hegemon at the end of great power war wants to consolidate legitimacy. We give up slightly power in short-term, when we decline we will declined slower due to institutions, that allow for legitimate competition.

If UN stops reflecting evolving world power, it will stop being relevant and competitive. India, Germany, EU, Japan, will move elsewhere to resolve problems.

---

Mearsheimer, John J. and respondents. 1998. The False Promise of International Institutions. In Theories of War and Peace, Michael E. Brown et al. eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, part IV, pp. 329-438.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

Pacific politics

Betts, Richard and Thomas Christensen. 2000/2001. China: Getting the Questions Right. The National Interest 62: 17-29.

Kang, David C. 2003. Getting Asia Wrong. International Security 27, 4: 57-85.

1. constructivism = world is all about theory. What theory people have in their heads makes the world be like that.

2. realism = the world is the way it is. We look at the empirics and let it be.

IV: defensive realism: argument: mellower than offensive realism. Why no challenge,

may become a democracy, not straight forward, GDP per capita not central to becoming democracy, more income inequality less democracy

But:

geography is central

deterrence = 2nd strike assurance

status quo bias = both do quite well under current institution

allies = china has no allies

moderate power transition, slow due to institutions

neither threatens vital interests of others

---

Katzenstein, Peter and Nobuo Okawara. 2001/2002. Japan, Asia-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism. International Security 26, 3: 153-85.

Cohen, Stephen P. 2001. Emerging Power India. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. 2003. Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York: Columbia University Press.

Cumings, Bruce. 1997. Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. New York: Norton.

---------------------------------------------------------------

Atlantic politics

Parent, Joseph M. 2011. Europe’s American Idol. In Uniting States: Voluntary Union in World Politics. New York: Oxford University Press, chap. 8, pp. 131-150.

Kupchan, Charles A. 2012. Selections from “Reviving the West.” In No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. New York: Oxford University Press, chap. 6, pp. 146-159, 176-181.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 30 May 2010. In defense of Europe: Now more than ever, it’s not smart to bet on the EU’s demise. Newsweek. Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/30/in-defense-of-europe.html

---

Lundestad, Geir. 2005. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945. New York: Oxford University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kupchan, Charles. 2004/2005. The Travails of Union: The American Experience and its Implications for Europe. Survival 46: 103-120.

Posen, Barry. 2006. European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity? Security Studies 15: 149-186.

Jones, Seth G. 2007. The Rise of European Security Cooperation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Eichengreen, Barry. 2007. The European Economy Since 1945. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

------------------------------------------------------------

Interventions, Imperial and Otherwise

Valentino, Benjamin A. 2011. The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth about a Noble Notion. Foreign Affairs 90, 6: 60-73.

MacDonald, Paul. 2009. Is Imperial Rule Obsolete? Assessing the Barriers to Overseas Adventurism. Security Studies 18, 1: 79-114.

Any tool that can do a lot of good can also do a lot of bad

1. Intro, peacekeeping, justice seeking, state building, democracy promotion, increasing trade, getting in and out.

2. al hirscman: Jeopardy (your policy wrecks us), futility (you're spending money to do nothing...and taking money away from ROI things), perversity (you're bringing a side-effect that goes against intentions ...in poverty policies, LBJ actually makes it worse)

3. realists: “delusion of impartial intervention...” – you'll make it worse – realists: perversity

4. liberals: fortna: evidence favors them. Why it fails often? Because it's the worst places that get intervention – that's not interesting. The real question is, does it work? And yes it does, often very cheaply.

5. realists: milk is spilled. Consequences and outcomes over focusing on the process. Don't get stuck on the past. Give dictators golden parachutes.

6. liberals: horrible incentive structure.

7. state-building: standard-language pushed by nation-state

8. liberals: rights

9. republicans: duties

10. they're flip sides of the same thing

11. erasmus – great for smart people to be stupid (which work was this?

12. There's a place for over-optimism/confidence – that's the only way you get people to start up on something crazy. There are lots of good reason to be anti-realistic about achievement, and doing hard things.

In praise of folly – erasmus

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Terrorism

Mueller, John. 2006. Is There Still a Terrorist Threat? The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy. Foreign Affairs 85, 5: 2-8.

mueller: more people have died in response to 9/11 than 9/11.

snyder, others: overextension

Lynn-Jones, Sean M. 2010. Preface. In Contending With Terrorism, Michael E. Brown et al. eds. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. xi-xli.

Problem with spoon-feeding?

You never learn how to ride without the training wheels.

Results = skill + will + capability

Most people have moderate will, no skill.

Capabilities increase with experience, but tends to also correlate with a decrease in will.

1. Terrorists and anti-modernity people: they want to turn back the clock, when they had more power

2. when do anti-modernist movements work?

3. does x matter is uninteresting, because everything matters. It's about the impact coefficient.

4. minimalists vs. maximalists

minimalist: terrorism is a medium-threat

maximalist: terrorism is the threat of our era, our communism. They are not rational like USSR, so we need to attack.

5. generally we've never been 1st strike, until recently.

6. relative threat is a real concept – (in the same way as relative desires)

---

Pillar, Paul. 2001. Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington DC: Brookings.

****, Robert. 2003. The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. American Political Science Review 97, 3: 343-61.

Hoffman, Bruce. 1998. Defining Terrorism. In Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, chap. 1, pp. 13-44.

--------------------------------------------------------------

Environmental Politics and conc.

Diamond, Jared. 2005. The World as a Polder: What Does It All Mean to Us Today? In Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. New York: Penguin, chap. 16, pp. 486-525.

Overoptimistic about human willingness for sacrifice. Basically giving worst-case scenarios of effects that only niche scholars care about. Kind of depressing and debilitating, that positive, happy people don’t want to read. People are notoriously short-sighted which he refuses to accept as standard. He empirically proves the shortcomings of his own argument with his Netherlands example, where the government got the country mobilized only after a terri-bad disaster struck them in the 1950s and where there’s a constant threat of a recurring disaster. Very few other places in the world care. The rich try to insulate themselves, and the poor and too busy trying to make it to the first-world life standards.

Anyways, good that it gets talked about, if not at a high standard here.

Schelling, Thomas C. 2002. What Makes Greenhouse Sense? Foreign Affairs 81, 3: 2-9.

Poor countries lose more than rich countries. But poor countries want their industrial revolution though and so big growers have expressed that they have zero interest reducing anything. The lack of certainty kept US out, but it can happen given the right executive to push it as his pet project and the next cycle of appropriate international environment. And it seems that nothing is as good for environmental awareness as increase in national wealth.

---

Bales, Carter F. and Richard D. Duke. 2008. Containing Climate Change. Foreign Affairs 87, 5: 78-89.

Simon, Julian. 2005. The Infinite Supply of Natural Resources. In International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, Robert Art and Robert Jervis eds. 7th Edn. New York: Pearson Longman, pp. 531-38.

---------------------------------------------

Coda:

Thucydides. Ca. 410 BCE. Funeral Oration of Pericles. Available at:

http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/education/thucydides.html

Lincoln, Abraham. 1863. Gettysburg Address. Available at:

http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm

Kennan, George F. 1993. Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy. New York: Norton, epilogue, pp. 251-59.

---

Polybius. 2000 [ca. 140 BC]. Selection from Book 38, sections 20-22. In The Histories, W.R. Paton trans. Cambridge: Harvard University Press/Loeb Classical Library, pp. 435-439.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1998 [ca. 1516]. The Prince. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, chap. 25, pp. 98-101.

Tolstoy, Leo. 1996 [1869]. Selection from Book 10, section 1. In War and Peace, George Gibian trans. New York: W.W. Norton, pp. 607-609.

A bit choppy...very much condensed.

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Re: IR/IPE theory

How persuasive are interest group explanations of trade policy? Discuss with reference to specific examples.
Argument: I argue that interest group explanations are more persuasive than institutional, and realist explanations.

Evidence:

Weaknesses: does not explain how preferences and transformed into policies. Interest group explanations are better at demand-side, less good at the supply-side of explaining politics.

Conclusion: They don't explain everything, but when looking at arguments, we need to look at how much explanatory heavy lifting an argument is doing, and interest group explanations do lots of heavy lifting. Thus, they are very persuasive.

..................

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Reserved for terms.

1. IPE

Embedded liberalism - stability, global market integration, no autonomy. - done in 1970s.

Development

Washington consensus - "standard" reform package for crisis-wrecked countries late 1980s - response to crashed latin america - aid in return of trade liberalization. Now Washington consensus is dead.

2. AFP (US foreign policy)

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Re: IR/IPE theory

by the way, not all posts will be this dry

Reserved for drafts.

------------------------------------------------------------------

MONEY AND FINANCE

Frieden, Lake - 15 - The triad and the unholy trinity (these are terms) - problems of international monetary cooperation (Ben Cohen)

1. Attractions and difficulties of cooperation among nations - on intl. monetary matters

2. Must sacrifice one of monetary stability, capital mobility, or monetary policy autonomy (thus the trinity)

1. Policy coordiantion since the mid-1980s has become fashionable again among govs.

2. 5 issues - a) magnitude of gains to be expected - consensus: "very large gains should not be expected", ... e) policy-makers are badly informed (blehh...)

Unholy trinity: (3)

1. capital mobility hard to control - "unholy trinity reduces to a direct trade-off between exchange-rate stability and policy autonomy"

How to "lock in" this cooperation?

1. What doesn't work - governments being educated to do what's good for them and all

2. common currency - very hard to leave once implemented. But very hard to implement.

"EC has gradually built up a highly complex process of policy-making in which formal and informal arrangements are intricately linked across a wide range of issues"

3. external authority - but only when states feel connected in other matters too - otherwise, resentment

Conclusion: International monetary integration is hard.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Frieden, Lake - 16 - Exchange rate politics (Frieden)

1. Currency policy more likely to excite controversy in economies more open

2. Internationally oriented economic actors more likely to want a fixed exchange rate than domestically oriented

3. Tradables producers more likely to want a weak (depreciated) currency than nontradables producers.

1. Political debates over exchange rates to grow as world becomes more financially and commercially integrated

2. Intl. financial and commercial sectors + MNCs and some exporters to support a fixed rate.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Frieden, Lake - 18 - Capital controls (Goodman, Pauly)

1. Controls on capital flows reduced in late 1970s and early 1980s due to changes in intl. production and finance - thus governments reduced/abandoned capital controls

2.

1. "Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, a broad movement away from capital controls was evident across the industrialized world. The rapid growth of liquid international funds and the increasing globalization of production drove this process. Offshore markets eroded national financial barriers, not least by providing ever-widening sources of funding for multinational firms" -- "tightening [of capital controls] soon exceeded the benefits (e.g. risk of no investment).

2. "the ultimate influence on policy came from the pressure to evade controls or exit from their national jurisdictions if they [firms] were to remain competitive ".

3. "It was easier for countries facing capital inflows (Japan and Germany) to lift capital controls than it was for countries facing capital outflows (France and Italy). The difference in timing - roughly a decade - underlines the mechanism by which systemic forces were translated into national decisions."

4. Movement back to capital controls costly

Some other stuff

Frieden, Lake - 13 - Domestic politics, intl. monetary order - gold standard

England - high interest rates, low inflation, creditors, finance strong.

France - landowners, build a big domestic reserve - stability

Germany - junkers, landowners, financial leaders looked for business from each other, not internationally - stability

Basically everyone did their role, although different roles to keep the system stable. Nowadays states value autonomy (domestic monetary autonomy) over stability (international financial stability) so we have a floating currency.

PRODUCTION

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Reserved for x.

4. Why have the world bank and the imf been criticized as “us-serving control instruments” over the economic policies of developing countries? Do you agree with these claims? Have these institutions contributed in any way to the process of development and growth of the poorest countries in the world? In your answer, give specific examples. (pure 12, world institutions only serve us – true or not)

Frieden, Lake - 10

1. "One tactic MNCs use to protect their investment is to involve the World Bank, IMF, and Inter-American Development banks".

"These and other transnational risk management strategies tend to support the general proposition that multinationals can structure the international economic system and respond to their own financial needs to the detriment of host states in the Third World".

Frieden, Lake - 11 - The role of MNCs reconsidered (Fieldhouse)

1. Dependency (MNCs reinforce the underdevelopment of the Third World?), potential costs and benefits

2. Impact of the MNC depends on the host government's ability to manage its relations with the firm

3. "Fieldhouse concludes that without looking at specific cases it is generally impossible to know whether an MNC will benefit or harm a host country"

Conclusion: "My conclusion is that...it is the state that now holds most of the cards and can determine the rules of the game." a) At the macroeconomic level it can adjust its policies in such a way that it is no longer possible for MNCs to make 'excessive' profits or attractive for them to import factors of production; B) At the administrative level, can implement anti-trust laws, impose quotas, limit prices - above all, insist on a minimal level of local participation in the equity and of nationals in employment; c) Nationalization i a rare last resort.

1. "A number of LDCs have now learnt that excessive foreign investment, if coupled with inappropriate economic and social management, may lead to virtual bankruptcy", dictation by the World Bank or the IMF and possibly domestic revolution".

Milner (Milner, PE) refers to Schattschneider who argued that special economic interests were mainly responsible for the choice of protectionism; he showed how these pressure groups hijacked the American Congress in 1929-30 and via a logroll produced one of the highest tariffs ever in American history, the Smoot-Hawley tariff.

Interest group explanations have been divided to factoral and sectoral explanations. The factor model (Heckscher-Ohlin) assumes factors of production can move costlessly among sectors. Thus the fortunes of owners of a particular factor rise and fall together regardless of which industry employs them. Second, regions naturally export goods whose manufacture uses intensively factors in which they are abundantly endowed and import goods intensive in their scarce factors. Thus trade benefits owners of abundant factors and, absent compensation, harms owners of scarce factors. Hence owners of abundant factors will favor free trade, owners of scarce factors will be protectionist, and empirically we would expect trade policy coalitions to form along factor or class lines (Alt - Frieden Lake, 331).

Factor model empirics (missing a part)

Rogowski (1989) found support for the Stolper-Samuelson-type factoral models.

Rogowski: That situation has positioned workers to demand greatly increased compensation: these groups, in short, have had large potential gains.

Sector model definition

The Ricardo-Viner model assumes that at least some factors cannot move between sectors of the economy, as some (perhaps most) investments are “stuck” in their present occupations. The fortunes of the specific factors in an industry then rise and fall together whether they are the same type of factor or not. Hence we would expect trade policy coalitions to form along the lines of exporting versus import-competing industries or sectors. If the United States is abundant in software-producing capital but scarce in up-to-date auto-producing capital, and if shifts between these uses are costly and slow, then software manufacturers will embrace free trade and automakers will be protectionist. Alt

Sector model empiric (missing a lot)

Frieden (1991) uses the Ricardo-Viner model.

CA: politician's preferences over interest groups, with empiric.

CA: Policy makers' opinions: A key example of this is Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who co-authored a central dependency theory book in the 1970s, arguing for the continuation of ISI policies to shelter LDCs from the capitalist world economy (Cardoso, Faletto 1979). In the 1990s, of course, Cardoso was elected president of Brazil and initiated a major economic reform program, including extensive trade liberalization. Changes in the ideas that policy-makers have about trade policy may then, as this example suggests, play a large role in affecting trade policy choices. Milner PE

CA: collective gains of economic restoration from the funk over interest groups, just arg

CA: Rodrik argues that macroeconomic crises of the 1980s were so bad that 'the overall gain from restoring the economy's health [in part via trade liberalization] became so large that it swamped distributional considerations (1994). Milner

Weaknesses and remaining challenges

Factor model weaknesses

What the mobile factors model does not readily explain is variations among capitalists and among workers (e.g. why automakers are protectionist but software manufacturers are not) as well as the rise of sectoral coalitions (e.g. between U.S. automakers and autoworkers) in support of protection. At the same time, the breakdown of factoral solidarity on trade issues should imply ever greater specificity of assets. Yet, as Kim (1992) shows for the U.S. case, both capital and labor have become far more mobile among regions and employments since World War I, and a three-factor Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts regional specialization within the United States far better after 1967 than before (and much better than before 1939). Alt

Notes: Rogowski does not believe that a factoral/conflict model will be able to tell who will win in such conflicts' it can tell where the axes of conflict will lie and which groups (given exogenous easing or contraction of trade) will be gaining relative to other, competing groups. He note however that “victory of defeat depends, so far as [he] can see, both on the relative size of the various groups and on the institutional and cultural factors that this perspective so resolutely ignores”.

Most of the disagreement seems to exist among the economic models, but no two are mutually exclusive. Each appears to explain some things the others do not, and the phenomena each emphasizes are likely to be at work to some degree. Alt

Lots of one-sentence empirics shoved together - oatley

The European Union's reluctance to liberalize European agriculture reflects EU policymakers' responses to the demands of European farmers. The Japanese government's commitment to high tariffs demands of European farmers. The Japanese government's need to respond to the demands of Japanese rice growers. The American effort to open foreign markets to American high technology and service exports while continuing to protect the American textile, apparel, and steel industries all reflect the influence that industry-based interest groups exert on American trade policy. Oatley

Factor model empirics oatley

And indeed, American labor unions have been very critical of globalization. AFL-CIO, a federation of 64 labor unions representing 13 million American workers, has been among the most prominent critics of globalization. It played a leading in organizing the protest against the WTO in Seattle in December 1999. In addition, it has fought consistently to prevent passage of fast-track authority. It is also highly critical of NAFTA and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). Oatley

And American business has been very supportive of globalization. The business roundtable, a business association composed of the chief executives of the largest American corporations, strongly supports globalization. It has been an active lobbyist for fast-track authority, it supports NAFTA and the FTAA, and it strongly supported China's entry into the WTO. The antional association of manufacturers, which represents about 14,000 American manufacturing firms, also supports the WTO and regional trade arrangements. Oatley

Thus, American labor and capital demands reflect the income consequences that the factor model highlights. The scarce factor, American labor, opposes trade liberalization, while the abundant factor, American capital, supports it. Oatley

Sector model empirics oatley

We might expect therefore that UNITE, the union of needletrades, industrial, and textile employees, the principal union in the American apparel industry, and the American textile manufacturers institute, a business association representing American textile firms, would both oppose globalization. Indeed, this is what we find. UNITE has been a vocal opponent of NAFTA, of the free trade area of the Americas, and of fast-track authority. For its part, the American textile manufacturers institute has not been critical of all trade agreements, but is has opposed free-trade agreements with South Korea and Singapore, has been very critical of the American decision to grant China permanent normal trade status, and does not support further opening of the US market to foreign textiles through multilateral trade negotiations. In general, labor and capital employed in textile and apparel are both skeptical of globalization.

Conversely, the sector model predicts that capital and labor in export-oriented industries will both support globalization. For example, a coalition of business associations representing American high-tech firms-- including the consumer electronics association, electronic industries alliance, information technology industry council, multimedia telecommunications association, the semiconductor industry association – has supported fast-track authority (the president, instead of the Congress, can negotiate international trade agreements*) the approval of normal trade relations with China, NAFTA, and the FTAA. While it is more difficult to document attitudes of workers employed in these industries, in large part because workers are not organized to the same extent as low- and medium-skill workers in manufacturing industries. However, workers in high-tech industries are predominantly high skilled, and on average, high-skilled workers are more supportive of trade liberalization than low-skill workers. Although this is indirect evidence, it is consistent with the prediction that both labor and capital employed in American high-technology industries will support globalization. Oatley

*the Congress still has to approve them

Questions that the interest model does not answer

Why import-competing groups on average seem to win out in net against exporting groups? Alt

2a – interest group definitions and evidence

so I moved it

Outline of how I want to see sections 2a-2b form.

1 - Interest groups milner outline of one-liners:

Interest groups and protectionism: One motive for this has been the observation that the extent of protection and the demands for it vary both across industries and across countries.

Explaining this variance has been a key feature of the literature.

Factoral versus sectoral policy preferences.

Evidence in support of the factoral model

Evidence in support of the sectoral model

Clout of the industry or how institutions shape its access to policymakers

Second, might not these differences in preferences give policy-makers a great deal of leeway to implement their own preferred policies, thus weakening the influence of interest groups?

The literature on interest groups in trade policy-making continues to wrestle with these issues.

..........................

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Re: IR/IPE theory

What a magnificient thread. I am gonna sleep, but gonna read it more carefully tomorrow. There is military topics, nice! Did i mention i want to study international relations if i don´t join the military academy. About the foreign aid, i got something. US aid on Haiti earthquake.

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Re: IR/IPE theory

What a magnificient thread. I am gonna sleep' date=' but gonna read it more carefully tomorrow. There is military topics, nice![/quote']

Thanks, please do stay posted, this is still very much under construction and missing almost all of the good information :)

EDIT: And please do study international relations, I take it you're into war and security?

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Thanks' date=' please do stay posted, this is still very much under construction and missing almost all of the good information :)

EDIT: And please do study international relations, I take it you're into war and security?[/quote']

Well my first option is Military Academy. I am fascinating about mlitary history, strategy, diplomacy, tactics and equipment. But is extremely hard to get into the academy. I am not just talking about grades, i am talking about Physical tests, medical tests, pyschological tests, psicotecnics tests, interviews and field training where you basically spend 2 weeks in a woods fighting for your own survival. But i am extremely motivated.

I must have a 2nd options as well, of course. It is international relations and history, thats the name. Both options has some similarities.

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Well my first option is Military Academy. I am fascinating about mlitary history' date=' strategy, diplomacy, tactics and equipment. But is extremely hard to get into the academy. I am not just talking about grades, i am talking about Physical tests, medical tests, pyschological tests, psicotecnics tests, interviews and field training where you basically spend 2 weeks in a woods fighting for your own survival. But i am extremely motivated.

I must have a 2nd options as well, of course. It is international relations and history, thats the name. Both options has some similarities.[/quote']

well good luck :)

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Central threats and challenges in American foreign policy at present:

a) Terrorism

Rather than being centrally an existential threat, its downside lays more on the potential effects of it. Citizens of countries psychologically fear an unpredictable threat that they cannot defend against. Should states be unable to defend well enough to satisfy the citizens (likely as the electorate will have unreasonable expectations), . If other countries than the US feel that the US is not able to manage the situation, they may begin to build up themselves, which indirectly leads to the possible creation of a peer military competitor, which the US does not want to see.

B) Rise of a peer competitor, generally assumed to be a regional hegemon:

America does not want to see the rise of a peer competitor, as shown by its willingness to intervene in the Gulf War against Iraq even with relatively high pre-war estimates of casualties. The threat of Iraq getting access to extra oil reserves and emerging as a regional hegemon in the Middle East was no acceptable. For the future, most likely peer competitors are China, Russia, India, Japan, and an independent European unified actor. For the most part, we don't anticipate any of the above to be a security threat at present - even offensive realists who are most worried about China agree that at present, China (which is the greatest threat of the above), is unlikely to be involved in a military conflict with the US. Nevertheless, the United States has no interest in losing its hegemonic position for now, although it has taken steps to retrench on some international commitments and encouraged its European allies to take leadership in some of the recent international conflicts.

c) Nuclear proliferation, especially in failed states and weak states.

Loose nukes go missing every year and may end up in hands of non-governmental actors. Nuke safety system in weak states are also risky, with countries like Pakistan refusing to use advanced safety mechanisms due to fear of sabotage from America (which may be a legitimate concern).

d) Economic over-extension, with balance-of-payments deficit catching up to us.

1. You cannot leave beyond your means forever

2. We don't know though how much beyond your means you can live, and for how long before investors lose confidence in your ability to pay back and stop borrowing you money. The smart money is that as the most powerful state, America is given quite a lot of lee-way on being able to borrow, but at some point we will be forced to cut back or at least limit the increase of BOP.

3. We owe China a lot of money, which for the time being means that we cannot extend ourselves far beyond China, but also it limits China's (we own our banker for owing them so much money they cannot afford to see us go bankrupt). Also, China's eagerness to buy American debt indicates that they don't wish to challenge the US as the global hegemon, showing that self-destruction, not external threat is the greater danger.

Counter-argument: We are still decades ahead of any other country in military strength, research and development, and other key indicators of competitiveness. Even if we had to slow down due to a decrease in available credit, it will take others too long to catch up before we have recovered.

e) The rise of a balancing coalition: If America is seen as a threat and for being involved too extensively, a balancing coalition against American primacy may form.

OTHER threats and problems

1. Environmental disasters

2. Humanitarian disasters and human rights abuses

3. Disintegration of institutions established in the post-war era favoring American hegemony and primacy

4. Bureaucratic politics in America dividing the country. For example, American nuclear present (strategy) has evolved from one emphasizing security dilemma to bureaucratic politics, with each faction (air force, submarines, etc.) wanting to control it. This can be extended to other larger parts of politics.

5. Slow-down of innovation. This is shown for example by our recent trend of pouring our talent to financial engineering (micro-transactions have no value added) instead of productive engineering. Also, we are consuming but devaluing productivity and investment, we are becoming like 1600 Spain only interested in hedonism, lol.

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Under construction...

1) what are the key challenges that failed states pose to american foreign policy and what is the best way to deal with them?

2) in a secret government laboratory in gary, indiana, elite scientists are gathered for a top-priority project. Within ten years, they must engineer a superhero with two superpowers and put him/her/it in the field to help the united states with its foreign policy problems. To what superhuman abilities should they devote their labors?

3) the national security council has asked you to draft a policy memorandum assessing the top threats that will face american foreign policy in the year 2020 and how best to meet these challenges.

4) “you are well aware that it is not numbers or strength that bring victories in war. No, it is when one side goes against the enemy with the gods’ gift of a stronger morale that their adversaries, as a rule, cannot withstand them.”

—xenophon, the persian expedition, book iii: The march to kurdestan

Argument: Force trumps morale. Disagree with Xenophon.

Evidence:

1. Clausewitz - war is like duel on a larger scale - and bound by the extremes of: a) reciprocal action - revenge, B) security dilemma when enemy is not destroyed, c) security competition

2.

Counter-argument: Morale trumps force

5) what does the past tell us about the future of the monroe doctrine?

6) “there is nothing more adverse to nature and reason than to hold in obedience remote countries and foreign nations, in opposition to their inclination and interest.”

—edward gibbon

7) what does the history of american nuclear doctrine tell us about the causes of american foreign policy since 1945?

8) “in the struggle between reason, on the one hand, and the momentum of military competition, on the other, reason proved a poor competitor.”

—george kennan

9) “to deal with the true causes of war one must begin by recognizing as of prime relevancy to the solution of the problem the familiar fact that civilization is a partial, incomplete, and, to a great extent, superficial modification of barbarism.”

—elihu root

10) “the pressure of outside opinion about human rights sustained over long periods of time, can indeed produce beneficial changes in both attitudes and institutions…. Whether governments, and the u.s. Government in particular, should be involved in exerting such pressures is more dubious. In this respect, governments have to take the world pretty much as they find it.”

—george kennan

11) which president’s foreign policy is the best model to manage america’s present problems?

1. Lynn-Jones outlines four paradigmic recommendations for US grand strategy:

a) Restraint: Washington

LJ: Does not serve US interests, other states will compete to fill the power vacuum

B) Selective engagement: Truman, Eisenhower

Prevent nuclear proliferation, and war between other great powers

LJ: US ignores humanitarian interventions, vague limits.

c) Cooperative security: UN

LJ: Collective action problem, unreliable to trust states to sacrifice state-interest to uphold global interests.

d) Primacy: Bush

LJ: Consumes lots of resources by over-extension. Encourages other states to create coalitions to balance against us.

12) what are the main causes of american adventurism abroad?

13) what were the biggest mistakes in american foreign relations and what practical policies would prevent their recurrence?

Argument: Over-extension in peripheral issues, e.g. Vietnam.

Evidence: Kennan: Nobody “dared to try to extract itself from the involvement at all, for fear of being pilloried by the silly charge that it had "lost Vietnam." “We might call the failures “popular diplomacy as opposed to professional diplomacy. ”

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Command of the Commons...

Posen:

Who do you think provides the common goods in the international system - keeps the shipping lanes safe...security and stability?

The US. Why? It's the hegemon.

But nobody ever likes the boss.

In return, the US sets the rules of the international system from which it derives benefits.

So what is not being done?

Well for one, Africa is starving and broke. Could we fix it? Yup. Will we fix it? Nope, at least not for now.

How do you fix it? Well, you could start by getting rid of agricultural subsidies and tariffs/other trade barriers for African agricultural products.

Why is it not being done? Domestic interest groups would lose out and would not look well upon that. For the time being, governments in advanced industrialized countries care more about these voters than a distant Africa.

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Re: IR/IPE theory

Globalization

Smith:

This sounds bad, but nothing really leads to happiness. Because you work really hard but it doesn't change your happiness, but you keep thinking it will, right, if you just get that other house, girl/boy, whatever -- that your felicity will be complete. But of course it doesn't go that way.

But happiness was not the point, it never was the point. If human beings weren't like this, they wouldn't do anything. They wouldn't create beautiful music or beautiful art, they wouldn't create buildings, they wouldn't make companies. All the things that make life worth living is based on lies and follies. It's because people think that they're going to personally get something, when in fact by chasing their private desires, they're creating public goods.

But human beings can't wrap their head around it. That this is the way it's supposed to be.

And so that's exactly what globalization is, it's basically just Adam Smith on steroids. And that's not going to lead to happiness, but that's not really the point, that's not the sales pitch of life. And yet, that's what drives people crazy - that's what makes them criticize and tear up globalization. It's a constant destruction. That's both an insult and a compliment.

Every act of creation is also an act of destruction. But that's not interesting. What's interesting is whether or not you can create something that's more beautiful than what you destroy. And the answer is sometimes.

Globalization is one of those things that you have to take on a case-by-case basis. In general, there has been no greater engine for human-want satisfaction, insofar as human wants can be satisfied, than globalization. Whatever you happen to want, globalization creates more of it. And generally that's health, and education, and culture, and jobs - but at the same time, it's tearing down all sorts of things that were there before, like traditions, and language, and so and so forth...

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Re: IR/IPE theory

American foreign policy options:

1. Restraint (Press, Layne)

Pros: There are no threats present right now, we should not risk over-extension. Over-extension leads to the formation of a balancing coalition against the US, as they perceive them as a threat.

Cons: An actor as powerful as America significantly decreasing its engagement in the international arena creates a power vacuum into which less desirable actors will move into.

2. Selective engagement (Robert Art)

Pros: We will stay away from peripheral issues that cause us to over-extend and risk formation of balancing alliances. We will focus our efforts to a) preventing nuclear proliferation, B) preventing the emergence of regional hegemons who may become peer competitors, c) preventing NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) attacks against the US. Also of benefit are a) keeping free trade flowing, B) promotion of democracy and human rights, and c) protecting the environment against ozone depletion and global warming

Cons: First of all, what is a peripheral issue? Issues that we deem peripheral at present may become central issues in the future. Korea was classified as a peripheral issue but has over time turned out to have a significant strategic importance. Also, by entangling ourselves on issues that are peripheral at present, that issue may balloon up and may lead for us to over-extend by default. Do we really want to risk great power war over a conflict in a peripheral country far away from us, like Georgia?

Nevertheless, these downsides can be adjusted for as circumstances change without extensive costs.

3. Cooperative security (Nolan, Kupchan)

Pros: Has legitimacy. Focus on conflict prevention, preventing nuclear proliferation, and conducting multilateral pre-emptive missions. Diplomacy.

Cons: How do you convince states to prioritize collective action over those of their state? How would you convince American people to risk soldiers on an issue that has nothing to do with the US, only for the sake of contributing to an organization? Also flaky in consistence, for many issues frozen in lack of action and quarreling between actors.

4. Primacy (Mastanduno, Wohlforth)

Pros: US hegemony is secure as the US has no intentions of infringing on states that don't threaten key American interests. Preventive engagement on issues like terrorism, prevention of the rise of hegemons specifically in the Pacific (or Eurasian, if including Russia) and Middle Eastern theaters, nuclear proliferation, and the rise of extreme anti-American actors in failed and weak states. For those complaining about the costs, we may engage in flexible response and the principle of unlimited resources (security trumps all, we will find the means and funds to do anything we need to do).

Cons: Threat of balancing alliances when America has thrown around its force too often. Over-extension. Allies distance themselves from us on medium-level issues due to sheer cost, causing the US to bear the burden on all non-existential threats.

The argument I'm going to make is for America to advance a combination of cooperative security and relatively a restrained level of selective engagement. The plan should be to maximize what we can from collective security, and fill the remaining economic, security, and threat-prevention eneds with selective engagement. This argument holds true in present conditions, but when conditions change a more offensive, primacy-focused direction may be preferred.

Posen, Lynn-Jones - throughout

Thoughts on the quality of arguments?

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